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__________________ 
 
OPINION 
__________________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge 
 Gershwain Sprauve and Andrea Smith appeal the 
District Court’s dismissal of their cases for the failure to state 
a claim.  The District Court found that Sprauve’s and Smith’s 
claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 failed because defendant West Indian 
Company, Limited (“WICO”), their former employer, is not a 
government entity.  Applying the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation, 513 U.S. 374 (1995), we hold that WICO must 
be considered a government entity for the purposes of 
Sprauve’s and Smith’s constitutional claims.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in 
part, and remand for further consideration of Sprauve’s and 
Smith’s claims. 
I. 
 
 We take most of the following facts from the 
plaintiffs’ complaints, which we assume to be true for the 
purposes of a motion to dismiss.  Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).  WICO was 
founded in 1912, prior to the United States’ acquisition of the 
Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917.  WICO began as a coal 
bunkering business and later grew to serve as the “Port 
Agent” for the cruise lines that visit the port of Charlotte 
Amalie in St. Thomas.  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 3, 33.  WICO 
also manages the Havensight Mall at that port.  Id.  In 1986, 
WICO began dredging activities in the St. Thomas harbor.  
Sprauve & Smith Br. 4.  This led to public opposition and 
litigation regarding the scope of these activities.  Id. 
 
 In 1993, the Government of the Virgin Islands 
purchased 100% of the shares of WICO through a Stock 
Purchase Agreement.  The purchase was approved by the 
Legislature of the Virgin Islands in a special session in Act 
No. 5826 (the “Act”).  J.A. 421.  The Act explains that “the 
Government of the Virgin Islands . . . has been engaged for a 
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number of years in proceedings, including litigation, 
regarding those certain rights of [WICO]” and that 
“acquisition of ownership of the Company by the 
Government would permit the final conclusion of all such 
proceedings and related disputes, and ensure that the 
development rights of the Company conferred by . . . 
agreements and treaties would be subject in all respects to the 
control of the Government.”  Id.  The Act further explains 
that acquisition of WICO would “transfer to public ownership 
and control substantial real estate, including certain areas that 
may be suitable for development for public use.”  Id.  Section 
8(b) of the Act provides: 
 
Upon acquisition of the Facilities and all of the 
issued and outstanding shares of common stock 
of the Company by the Government, the 
Company is hereby granted the status and 
authority of a public corporation and 
governmental instrumentality of the 
Government of the Virgin Islands of the United 
States and shall be deemed to be a public entity 
operating on behalf of the Government, rather 
than a private corporation . . . . 
 
J.A. 424. 
 
 Following this acquisition, it is undisputed that 100% 
of WICO shares were transferred to the Virgin Islands Public 
Finance Authority (“PFA”), a public corporation and 
governmental instrumentality created by the Government of 
the Virgin Islands.  J.A. 229–30.  The PFA is run by a board 
of directors appointed by the Governor of the Virgin Islands, 
with the advice and consent of the Virgin Islands Legislature.  
J.A. 33.  WICO is run by its own board of directors, 
appointed by the PFA.  Id.  
 
 Plaintiff Gershwain Sprauve began working at WICO 
in 1997 as the Manager of Mall Operations.  In 2009, WICO 
President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Edward 
Thomas indicated to the WICO Board of Directors (the 
“Board”) that he planned to retire.  Sprauve submitted his 
application for the position and Thomas verbally 
recommended Sprauve for the job to the Board.  In March 
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2010, the Board offered the CEO position to Sprauve, but it 
later reneged on this offer.  In December 2010, the Board 
extended Thomas’s contract.  In 2011, Thomas again 
recommended Sprauve to the Board as his replacement.  The 
Board instead convened a search committee and eventually 
hired defendant Joseph Boschulte as the new CEO and 
President of WICO.  Boschulte began his tenure in that 
position on May 1, 2012.  
 
 Sprauve alleges that Boschulte was hostile toward him 
and falsely accused him of making various mistakes in the 
workplace.  Sprauve eventually wrote a letter to the Board 
complaining about Boschulte’s behavior.  The Board 
launched an investigation. Shortly after this investigation, 
Boschulte terminated Sprauve, alleging he failed to attend a 
hearing before the Legislature’s Finance Committee to 
discuss WICO’s budget. Sprauve asserts that this allegation 
was pretext. 
 
 Plaintiff Andrea Smith began working at WICO in 
1981, before the company was purchased by the Virgin 
Islands.  In 2012, she was promoted to Chief Financial 
Officer. When Edward Thomas retired, she served as the 
Interim President and CEO of WICO until Boschulte was 
hired.  Smith alleges that Boschulte knew that she had been 
interviewed by the Board as part of its investigation into 
Sprauve’s claim and that Boschulte became angry with her.  
She alleges that he then took various retaliatory actions 
against her.  On January 11, 2013, Boschulte terminated 
Smith for what he called “failure to execute.”  J.A. 38. 
 
 On January 28, 2013, Sprauve filed a complaint 
against WICO and Boschulte in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands.  He alleged violations of his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Boschulte, and a number of claims under Virgin Islands law.  
WICO and Boschulte moved to dismiss Sprauve’s complaint 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  
The Court granted the motion.  J.A. 398. 
 
 Smith filed her own complaint against WICO and 
Boschulte alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth 
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Amendments, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Boschulte, and a number of claims under Virgin Islands law.  
WICO and Boschulte filed a motion to dismiss under Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Boschulte filed a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted the motions.  
J.A. 393; Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) 2.  
 
 The District Court conducted the same analysis in 
granting both WICO’s and Boschulte’s motions to dismiss.  It 
explained that “[t]he first and central issue raised . . .  is 
whether WICO is a public corporation with public employees 
versus a private entity with private employees.”  J.A. 405; 
S.A. 9.  To make this determination, the District Court first 
looked to decisions of the Virgin Islands Public Employees 
Relations Board (“PERB”), which found that WICO 
employees are not public employees.  J.A. 405–07; S.A. 9–
10.  Next, the District Court examined the language of the 
Act.  J.A. 407; S.A. 10–11.  The District Court ultimately 
concluded that “WICO cannot be considered a purely public 
entity,” that its employees are not public employees, and that 
it is not a public corporation.  J.A. 407–08; S.A. 11–12.  The 
District Court then found that because WICO is not a public 
entity, its alleged conduct could not be considered to have 
been “under color of state law” for purposes of liability under 
section 1983, J.A. 409; S.A. 13, and that Smith and Sprauve’s 
direct constitutional claims fail because WICO and Boschulte 
are private actors.  J.A. 411; S.A. 14–17.  Finally, the District 
Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining claims under Virgin Islands law.  J.A. 412; S.A. 
18. 
 
 Both Sprauve and Smith timely appealed.1 
                                              
1In both Sprauve’s and Smith’s cases the defendants also 
moved to quash service of process to the WICO Board and to 
dismiss all claims against the Board.  The District Court 
granted these motions and the plaintiffs have not appealed 
these portions of the District Court opinions.  In addition, 
plainti ff Smith conceded that her claims for negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud (Count XIII) and false light 
(Count XIV) should be dismissed.  App. 370.  The District 
Court also dismissed Smith’s free association claim (Count 
XVIII) on the merits, and Smith has not appealed that ruling.  
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II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
standard of review for a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) is de novo.  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230.2 
 
III. 
 
 Sprauve and Smith bring claims under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  To 
state a section 1983 claim, Sprauve and Smith must allege 
facts demonstrating, inter alia, that the misconduct they 
complain of was “under color of state law.”  Groman v. Twp. 
of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995).  To state a 
constitutional claim, they must allege facts showing, inter 
alia, that the misconduct involved “state action.”  Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).  The 
“under color of state law” analysis is equivalent to the “state 
action” analysis.  Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[i]t is fair 
to say that ‘our cases deciding when private action might be 
deemed that of the state have not been a model of 
consistency.’”  Lebron, 513 U.S. at 378 (quoting Edmonson 
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  Armed with that body of law, we 
have endeavored to determine whether state action exists in 
circumstances including where an activity is significantly 
encouraged by the state, where the state acts as a joint 
participant, and where an actor “performs a function 
                                                                                                     
 
2 The defendants filed motions to dismiss under both Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The District Court purported to grant 
defendants’ motions under 12(b)(1), but did so using a Rule 
12(b)(6) analysis.  Thus, we will treat the order as having 
been issued under Rule 12(b)(6).  See, e.g., Kehr Packages, 
Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408–09 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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designated by the state, or is entwined with government 
policies or management.”  Leshko, 423 F.3d at 340.  We have 
described this process as “labyrinthine,” id. at 338, “murky,” 
Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 
591 (3d Cir. 1979), and a “protean concept,” Magill v. 
Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (quotation marks omitted). 
 However, we may avoid this determination of whether 
private party conduct constitutes state action when the actor is 
the government.  See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 378 (noting that 
“[i]t may be unnecessary to traverse [the] difficult terrain [of 
private party state action analysis] in the present case, since 
Lebron’s first argument is that Amtrak is not a private entity 
but Government itself”). 3  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lebron sets forth guideposts for resolving whether a 
corporate entity may be considered the government for 
purposes of constitutional claims.  The plaintiffs argue that 
WICO is a governmental entity and is therefore subject to 
claims under the United States Constitution and under section 
1983.  Applying Lebron, we agree. 
 
A. 
 
 In Lebron, the petitioner filed a lawsuit against the 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (also known as 
Amtrak) claiming that it had violated his First and Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Id. at 377.  Amtrak was established in 
1970 by Congress, inter alia, “in order to avert the threatened 
extinction of passenger trains in the United States,” id. at 383, 
and was to operate, to the extent consistent with federal law, 
subject to the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, 
see  45 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).  Amtrak later incorporated under 
that statute.  See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 385.  See also 45 U.S.C. 
§ 541 (1970) (authorizing incorporation of Amtrak).  A 
majority of Amtrak’s governing board is appointed by the 
Government and Amtrak is required to submit three separate 
                                              
3 To repeat, we are only examining whether WICO is a 
government entity for the purpose of determining whether 
constitutional claims can be lodged directly against it.  This 
Opinion does not address, for example, whether WICO is 
entitled to governmental immunities.  We leave that issue for 
another day. 
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annual reports to the Government.  Lebron, 513 U.S. at 385.  
Nonetheless, Congress provided that Amtrak “shall not be an 
agency, instrumentality, authority, or entity, or establishment 
of the United States Government.”  45 U.S.C. § 541 (1970). 
 
 To give some context to its analysis, the Lebron Court 
first engaged in a detailed recitation of “the long history of 
corporations created and participated in by the United States” 
with a particular focus on level of control by the Government.  
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386.  The first such corporation was the 
Bank of the United States, created in 1791, but the 
Government’s participation in that corporation was limited to 
holding twenty percent of the Bank’s stock.  Id. at 386–87.  
The Government first participated in a corporation in which it 
appointed a majority of the corporation’s directors – thus 
controlling the corporation – in 1902.  Id. at 387.  Congress 
that year authorized the President to acquire the assets of the 
New Panama Canal Company of France, including its 
holdings in the Panama Railroad Company – much like Act 
No. 5826 authorized the Government of the Virgin Islands to 
acquire WICO.  See id.  The purpose of the purchase was “to 
facilitate construction of the Panama Canal.”  Id.  The 
Government “became the sole shareholder of the Panama 
Railroad, and continued to operate it under its original 
charter, with the Secretary of War, as the holder of the stock, 
electing the Railroad’s 13 directors.”  Id.  By the end of 
World War II, the number of Government corporations had 
grown to fifty-eight, and immediately after that war, many of 
those corporations were dissolved because of Congress’s 
perception that “Government-created and -controlled 
corporations had gotten out of hand in both their number and 
their lack of accountability.”  Id. at 389.  A new wave of 
Government corporations began again in the 1960s and, 
starting in 1962, these corporations were largely designated 
not to be Government agencies.  Id. at 390.  Congress 
intended that these new Government corporations (such as the 
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat)) would 
compete in the private sector, “unhindered by the restraints of 
bureaucracy and politics.”  Id. at 391.  Despite being labeled 
as not Government entities, governance structures varied in 
these new Government corporations.  While Comsat’s board 
was controlled by twelve privately-appointed directors (and 
three appointed by the President), other Government 
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corporations such as the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 
the Legal Services Corporation, and Amtrak, gave voting 
control to Government appointees.  Id.  
 
 Amtrak’s first argument to the Court in Lebron was 
that Congress’s disclaimer of Amtrak’s Government agency 
status was dispositive of Lebron’s constitutional claims.  The 
Court acknowledged that this disclaimer of status was 
controlling for matters within Congress’s control.  Id. at 392.  
The Court noted that such matters include waivers of 
sovereign immunity and whether statutes such as the 
Administrative Procedure Act and laws regarding 
Government procurement apply to the entity.  However, the 
Court held that Congress could not determine whether 
Amtrak was a Government entity for purposes of 
constitutional claims.  Id.  The Court reasoned that “[i]f 
Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the Constitution regards as 
the Government, congressional pronouncement that it is not 
such can no more relieve it of its First Amendment 
restrictions than a similar pronouncement could exempt the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id.  As a result, the Court rejected Amtrak’s 
first argument.4 
 
 The Lebron Court acknowledged that the question of 
whether Amtrak could be considered a Government agency or 
instrumentality for the purpose of constitutional claims 
against it was not answered by a statute or by prior caselaw.  
Id. at 394.  So, the Court analyzed two factors to answer this 
question.  First, the Court noted that Amtrak was established 
by a special statute for the purpose of furthering 
governmental goals.  Id. at 397.  Second, consistent with 
other parts of the opinion, the Court focused heavily on 
                                              
4 Our Court has similarly observed that labels alone are not 
dispositive of the state actor issue and emphasized that we 
look to the “reality over the form” of the nature of the state 
actor’s relationship with the state.  Leshko, 423 F.3d at 342 
(concluding foster parents are not state actors despite a 
Pennsylvania law that designates them public employees). 
 Thus, we consider facts, rather than labels to determine 
whether an entity or person is a state actor for section 1983 
purposes. 
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control of the corporation.  Id. at 397–98.  An important 
measure of control to the Court was whether a majority of the 
governing body of the corporation was appointed by the 
federal or state government.  Id.  For instance, the Court 
noted that in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City 
Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curiam): 
we held that Girard College, which has been 
built and maintained pursuant to a privately 
erected trust, was nevertheless a governmental 
actor for constitutional purposes because it was 
operated and controlled by a board of state 
appointees, which was itself a state agency.  
Amtrak seems to us an a fortiori case. 
 
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 (citation omitted).  Another measure 
of control was its duration.  The Court recognized that six of 
Amtrak’s eight externally-named directors were appointed by 
the Government and that this control was not merely 
temporary.  Id. at 397–98.  As a result, the Court held “that 
where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by 
special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, 
and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a 
majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is 
part of the Government for purposes of the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 400.   
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
 Applying the Lebron decision to the facts of this case, 
we note first that WICO was established as “a public 
corporation and governmental instrumentality of the 
Government of the Virgin Islands of the United States,”5 J.A. 
                                              
5 It is immaterial to our analysis that WICO existed as a 
private corporation before it became a public corporation of 
the Virgin Islands.  See Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 
919, 921 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[t]he first part of the 
Lebron test is satisfied” where “[t]he Red Cross originated as 
a private corporation, organized under the laws of the District 
of Columbia in 1881 [and] Congress reincorporated the Red 
Cross in 1905 . . . .”); Becker v. Gallaudet Univ., 66 F. Supp. 
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61, in a special session of the Twentieth Legislature of the 
Virgin Islands in 1993.  J.A. 58–63 (Act No. 5826).6  The 
government of the Virgin Islands took this action to further 
several government objectives.  See Horvath v. Westport 
Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (determining 
that “the Library was created by a special act of the 
Connecticut State legislature and there is no doubt that the 
provision of library services is a legitimate statutory 
objective” and holding that “the Lebron standard has been 
satisfied.”); Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 
F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the first part of 
Lebron was “easily satisfied [because] the State of 
Connecticut created the corporate entity by special law, and 
higher education is a governmental objective (although not 
the exclusive province of government)”), abrogated on other 
grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).  
See generally Clark v. Cnty. of Placer, 923 F. Supp. 1278, 
1284 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (“[A]ll that is required for the purpose 
of § 1983 liability under Lebron is that the corporation have a 
‘public statutory mission.’”) (citation omitted).7      
                                                                                                     
2d 16, 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (determining that the first Lebron 
factor was satisfied although the institution was founded 
privately in 1856 and incorporated by Congress in 1857); 
Clark v. Cnty. of Placer, 923 F. Supp. 1278, 1283 n.8 (E.D. 
Cal. 1996) (“The court does not regard the fact that at one 
time the PCFA operated free of the county as a significant 
distinction between the matter at bar and Lebron.”) (citation 
omitted).  See also Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 (noting a prior 
case where Girard College, which was founded and 
maintained through a privately erected trust, was held to be a 
governmental actor (citing Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts of 
Phila., 353 U.S. at 231)).   
 
6 We have recognized “that in deciding a motion to dismiss, 
courts generally may consider only the allegations contained 
in the complaint, exhibits attached thereto, and matters of 
public record.”  Beverly Enters., Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183, 
190 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999).  The materials cited herein fit within 
those parameters. 
 
7 By way of background, Denmark granted WICO land 
“located in the Long Bay area of the St. Thomas Harbor and 
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One government objective of Act No. 5826 was to 
resolve all disputes – including litigation – between the 
Virgin Islands and WICO.  J.A. 58.  Another government 
objective of the Act was to ensure WICO’s development 
rights were “subject in all respects to the control of the 
Government.”  Id.  Still another government objective was to 
“transfer to public ownership and control substantial real 
estate, including certain areas that may be suitable for 
development for public use, as well as areas that may produce 
income . . .”  Id.  See J.A. 61 (“It is hereby resolved and 
declared that the purchase of the Facilities pursuant to this 
Act, and the operation and maintenance of the Facilities, and 
the collection of the revenues derived from the operation of 
the Facilities . . . constitute public purposes.”). 
 
Second, the Virgin Islands government clearly has 
permanent8 and complete control over WICO as a result of 
                                                                                                     
other areas in Charlotte Amalie in the United States Virgin 
Islands,” J.A. 64, along with buildings and improvements on 
the land, as well as “rights to reclaim and develop certain 
submerged lands in the St. Thomas Harbor,” id., and that 
grant was preserved when Denmark ceded the Virgin Islands 
to the United States in 1917.  West Indian Co, Ltd. v. Gov’t 
of V.I., 643 F. Supp. 869, 870 (D.V.I. 1986).  See J.A. 68 
(noting WICO’s rights over “wharves, docks, piers, slips, 
[and] retaining walls.”).  WICO and the Virgin Islands had 
many disputes between them over the course of time.  See 
Alexander A. Farrelly, Governor of the United States Virgin 
Islands, State of the Territory Address at the Senate 
Chambers, 12 (Jan. 14, 1993) (noting WICO’s “controlling 
rights of Charlotte Amalie’s harbor . . . has been a source of 
great concern to all of us.  Repeatedly, various attempts by 
this government to exercise some degree of regulation and 
regain control over this strategic port of entry have been 
thwarted by the treaty stipulations and the courts.”).  For 
instance, as discussed earlier, WICO’s dredging operations 
were hotly contested between the parties.  See West Indian 
Co., 643 F. Supp. at 870–84. 
 
8 The Lebron Court noted that temporary Government control 
would not satisfy the second, or control, factor.  See 513 U.S. 
at 395.  Accordingly, the requisite control of a corporation 
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the Act.  Specifically, the Board is composed of nine 
directors.  West Indian Co. Ltd. Fiscal Year 2015 Budget 
Hearings Post Audit Div., Comm. on Fin., 30th Legis. 2 
(2014) (Report of Jose L. George, Post Auditor).  The parties 
do not dispute that all of these directors are appointed by the 
PFA.  See id. (noting that the Act directed the Governor of 
the Virgin Islands to transfer all of the WICO’s stock to the 
PFA); J.A. 60 (same).  See generally Hack, 237 F.3d at 84 
(holding that the Lebron control factor was not met and 
noting “[t]wo of nineteen board members is . . . a long way 
from control”); Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919, 
921–22 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Lebron and holding that the 
Government did not control the Red Cross because the 
Government appoints only eight of fifty-three on the 
governing board); Barrios-Velazquez v. Asociacion de 
Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 84 F.3d 487, 
492 (1st Cir. 1996) (determining that Lebron control factor 
not met because “the government of Puerto Rico does not 
retain the power to appoint any of [the corporation’s] 
directors”); Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan 
Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying 
Lebron and holding that the Government’s control over 
Freddie Mac was missing because the “government is entitled 
to appoint fewer than one-third of Freddie Mac’s directors”); 
Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 45 
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding that Lebron control factor was met 
                                                                                                     
does not exist where “the Government exerts its control [] as 
a creditor,” id., where “a provision exists that will 
automatically terminate control upon termination of a 
temporary financial interest,” id., or where the Government is 
acting as a conservator, Garcia v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 
782 F.3d 736, 744 (6th Cir. 2015) (Donald, J., concurring) 
(noting holdings in Lebron and Mik v. Fed. Home Loan 
Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149 (6th Cir. 2014) that “a necessary 
condition precedent to consider a once-private entity a state 
actor is that the government has ‘permanent’ control over the 
entity,” and concluding that “FHFA’s conservatorship of 
Freddie Mac . . . is, by definition, temporary”).  It is 
undisputed that the Virgin Islands’ control of WICO is 
permanent. 
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because “LSC’s Board is composed entirely of political 
appointees”).9   
Accordingly, the factors set forth in Lebron are met 
and, therefore, WICO is an agency or instrumentality of the 
Virgin Islands and subject to the constraints of the 
Constitution.   
 
2. 
 
The defendants argue that WICO should not be 
considered a government entity because WICO employees, 
unlike other government employees, “are not beneficiaries of 
the Government Employees’ Retirement System, are not 
covered by the Personnel Merit System, are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Public Employees Relations Board, and are 
not hired through the Division of Personnel.”  WICO Br. 17.  
We are not persuaded by this argument.  The Lebron decision 
counsels that while statutes may be dispositive of matters 
within government control, “such as the Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . and the laws governing Government 
procurement,” 513 U.S. at 392, reliance on such statutes to 
determine the constitutional rights of citizens is “misplaced.”  
Id.10   Indeed, a comparison of the facts of Lebron with the 
                                              
9 We note that several courts have held the Lebron factor of 
control was met in the absence of the government having the 
right to appoint a majority of a corporate entity’s governing 
board where there exist other indicia of government control.  
See, e.g., Horvath, 362 F.3d at 153 (holding that although “it 
is correct that only one-half, and not a majority, of the 
Library’s trustees are appointed by the Town . . . [t]he 
additional fact that [almost nine tenths] of the Library’s 
funding comes from . . . the Town convinces us that the Town 
maintains sufficient control over the Library”); Becker, 66 F. 
Supp. 2d at 21 n.6 (holding that the composition of the 
governing board was not the “sole factor” determining 
government control). 
 
10 The appellees’ statement that WICO employees “are not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Employees Relations 
Board [‘PERB’],” WICO Br. 17, refers to two decisions by 
the PERB regarding its limited jurisdiction.  Insofar as neither 
PERB decision considered claims under the Constitution, we 
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present case shows why the appellees’ argument must be 
rejected.  While the appellees here ask us to assume the 
Virgin Islands intended that WICO be considered a private 
entity because WICO employees are treated differently than 
other government employees in several respects and ask us 
essentially to ignore the clear language of the Act providing 
that WICO is “a public corporation and governmental 
instrumentality of the Government of the Virgin Islands of the 
United States,” Congress explicitly provided that Amtrak was 
not a government entity.  Despite Congress’s clear direction, 
the Court in Lebron held that Amtrak was to be considered a 
Government entity for purposes of claims under the 
Constitution.  Id. at 400.  See Wilkinson, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 
44, 45 (holding that where Congress provided that the Legal 
Services Corporation in all but several respects “should be 
treated as a private, non-profit corporation,” it is outside 
Congress’s authority “to make the final determination of 
LSC’s status as a government entity for purposes of 
determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its 
actions.”) (citing Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392).  WICO is 
similarly a government entity for purposes of plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claims.   
 
The defendants also seize upon language in the Act 
providing that WICO is empowered to take action “under the 
general business corporation laws of the Virgin Islands,” J.A. 
60, unless such laws are inconsistent with the Act.  J.A. 61.  
This, they contend, means that WICO operates as a private 
company and should be treated as such.  WICO Br. 23.  This 
argument is also foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lebron.  In Lebron, the Court explained that Amtrak “is 
subject to the provisions of [the District of Columbia 
Business Corporation] Act only insofar as the [Act creating 
                                                                                                     
need not consider them.  See Richards v. City of Lowell, 472 
F. Supp. 2d 51, 71 n.9 (D. Mass. 2007) (conducting an 
analysis under Lebron and noting “[t]he City has cited a 
number of cases to support its argument that the GLWIB was 
not a municipal agency and [the plaintiff] was not a City 
employee.  None of these cases addresses the question of 
whether, for constitutional purposes, actions taken by 
employees of a workforce investment board may be fairly 
attributable to the City.”) (citation omitted).  
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Amtrak] does not provide to the contrary.”  513 U.S. at 385.  
The Court in Lebron was not persuaded by this feature of 
Amtrak’s corporate structure and, indeed, the Court 
admonished that “[i]t surely cannot be that government, state 
or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations 
imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the 
corporate form.”  Id. at 397.  We therefore reject the 
defendants’ argument.           
 
*          *          *          *          * 
 
 Because WICO was established as a government 
corporation pursuant to a special Act of the Virgin Islands 
Legislature to further government objectives, and WICO is 
permanently and completely controlled by government 
appointees, it is part of the government for purposes of the 
constitutional claims and section 1983 claims brought by 
Sprauve and Smith.11  
                                              
11 Because our decision reverses the basis on which the 
District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Sprauve’s and Smith’s state law claims, we will also 
vacate that portion of the order and remand to the District 
Court to give it an opportunity to consider exercising its 
jurisdiction over those claims. See Trinity Indus. v. Chicago 
Bridge Co., 735 F.3d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 
 We express no opinion as to the merits of the 
remaining claims in this case, except as to the appellants’ 
direct constitutional claims against Boschulte in his personal 
capacity.  These claims are duplicative of their section 1983 
claims against him.  They arise from the same basic events—
Sprauve’s and Smith’s respective terminations—and raise 
substantially the same allegations.  See, e.g., J.A. 40, 45 
(Smith alleging in Count VII, under section 1983, that her due 
process rights were violated when her employment was 
terminated by Boschulte “without affording [her] notice or 
opportunity to be heard” and Count II, alleging that under the 
Fourteenth Amendment that WICO, the Board, and 
Boschulte, in both his personal and professional capacities 
“engaged in a continuing course of conduct” that deprived her 
of her due process rights “by not affording [her] [notice] and 
opportunity to be heard before terminating her employment.”)   
18 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further consideration of Sprauve’s and Smith’s 
claims consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                                                                                     
As we held in Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
“[i]nasmuch as § 1983 affords a remedy for infringement of 
one’s constitutional rights, identical claims raised under the 
Fourteenth Amendment are redundant, rendering the outcome 
of the § 1983 claims dispositive of the independent 
constitutional claims.”  588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009); see 
also Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680. 686 (3d Cir. 
1980) (in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, “it 
would be a redundant and wasteful use of judicial resources 
to permit the adjudication of both direct constitutional and § 
1983 claims where the latter wholly subsume the former.”).  
Because section 1983 affords the appellants a remedy against 
Boschulte in his personal capacity for the due process and 
equal protection claims they have brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we will affirm the dismissal of these 
direct constitutional claims against him as redundant.  
Applying the same reasoning, because section 1983 similarly 
affords the appellants a remedy against him in his personal 
capacity for the free speech and free association claims they 
brought under the First Amendment, we will also affirm the 
dismissal of these direct constitutional claims against 
Boschulte. 
 
